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Abstract
Diverse needs and preferences across the United States provide justification
for the devolution, or decentralization, of many Federal Government
programs to the State or local level. The move toward devolution, however,
has not been evidenced in U.S. agricultural policy, despite significant differ-
ences across States in such areas as commodity production, production
costs, income distribution, and opportunities for off-farm work. The existing
structure of USDA funding and program delivery already reflects an appre-
ciation of the gains from devolution, with some programs accommodating
differences in State and regional preferences. This report considers the
implications of devolving $22 billion in 2003 budget outlays, mostly for
domestic commodity and natural resource programs and rural development
and housing programs. The local knowledge of needs and preferences is
valuable and can provide the basis for increased program efficiency.
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A Consideration of the Devolution of Federal Agricultural Policy/ AER-836
Economic Research Service/USDAWhat level of government—Federal, State, or local—is best to devise, fund,
and administer public policies and programs? The U.S. Constitution lays out
broad principles to bound Federal action, but, at a practical level, Congress
confronts this question each time legislation is written. Devolution is the
circumstance in which funding and/or control of formerly Federal or
national programs is moved to the State or local level. Current agricultural
policy is concentrated at the Federal level, rather than at more decentralized
levels. In light of agricultural diversity among States and the possible advan-
tages to more local control of government programs, it is time to consider
whether this concentration of power may impede the ability of agricultural
policy to effectively address the new face of agriculture in the United States.
This consideration is especially relevant in light of the European Union’s
(EU) 2003 reform of its Common Agricultural Policy, in which traditional
payments to farmers were recast and control over their use devolved to
member states. The EU reforms represent a shift from an emphasis on agri-
cultural production to the rural economy and environment, in effect a move
from sectoral to geographic policies. At the same time, the responsibility for
shaping the content of those policies largely moves to the member states,
which may themselves further devolve the program authority, as has the
United Kingdom. As a recent ERS report noted, “With the adoption of EU
policy reforms, U.S. and EU commodity policies are becoming more
similar, with increased emphasis on decoupled income support and greater
focus on the interactions between agriculture and the environment”
(USDA/ERS, 2004). These similarities provide one impetus for the consid-
erations of devolution in this report.
The recognition of drawbacks to the concentration of power at the Federal
level has spurred the devolution of many Federal programs, including Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the primary income assistance
program designed for single women with children. Prior to passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA, or welfare reform), the rules for AFDC were essentially the
same across all States. After PRWORA, States assumed control of the
program (renamed Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)), and
the funding mechanism was changed from a matching grant to a block grant
program. States were free to design their own programs as long as the
redesigned programs met certain principles. Other Federal programs have
devolved to some degree, including programs associated with job training
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Susan Offutt, and Mitchell Morehart*(Botsko et al., 2001), housing assistance (Orlebeke, 2000), and environ-
mental policy (Butler and Macey, 1996). Reeder (1996) examines devolu-
tion of rural development. 
Previous studies have examined devolution of various Federal programs, but
this study is the first to consider devolution of Federal agricultural
programs. While some agricultural programs are best maintained at the
Federal level, the great cross-State differences in commodity production,
income distribution, costs of production, and opportunities for off-farm
work raise the possibility that the devolution of some agricultural programs
may lead to superior outcomes. 
The extent of geographic diversity across States must be considered in any
decision to devolve Federal agricultural programs. Another important
consideration is the ability of devolution to help the government better
achieve its goals. Defining the goals of any government program, much less
one as broad as agricultural policy, is difficult. Wright (1995) defines the
following as ongoing goals of agricultural policy: making farming perma-
nently more attractive to the young; equalizing the distribution of income by
measures related to landholdings; stabilizing farm incomes; achieving rural
development; saving family farming; providing farm-specific consulting on
technical or managerial issues; supporting applied research on fully
marketable innovations; increasing price supports, deficiency payments, or
other transfers to make current farmers more wealthy; providing egalitarian
direct transfers to farmers; protecting producers against risk; conducting
agricultural research to produce externalities; providing environmental serv-
ices not privately capturable; assisting disadvantaged consumers; providing
food security; protecting against monopoly or monopsony; collecting or
disseminating information; and protecting health, safety, and quality. For
reasons articulated later, we believe that at least a subset of these goals may
be better attained if agricultural programs were devolved.
This study distinguishes between the goals and the tools of agricultural
policy. As viewed here, present construction of agricultural policies is one of
many ways of achieving the goals of agricultural policies. We do not believe
the present construction defines the goals of agricultural policy. If one
instead maintains that the present construction of agricultural policy defines
the goals of agricultural policy, one’s discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages associated with the devolution of agricultural policy would be
very different. For example, if one defines the maximization of rents for
farmers producing certain commodities as both one of the means and one of
the goals of agricultural policy, the discussion would then entail a considera-
tion of whether this maximization of rents is best conducted at the Federal
or at a more local level. We resist such an equality of the goals and means
of agricultural policy. Our arguments for and against devolution are framed
in terms of what we believe are the goals of agricultural policy. 
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There are advantages to funding and managing some government activities
at higher levels of government, especially at the Federal level. First, macro-
economic stabilization is generally possible only at the national level. States
are ill-suited for this role because they do not have access to one of the key
tools used in macroeconomic stabilization, monetary policy. Moreover, any
efforts to engage in fiscal stabilization (another macroeconomic tool) are
likely to be dissipated due to open borders between States, and many States
are legally prohibited from using another macroeconomic tool, deficit
spending. (The inability of States to engage in countercyclical measures, at
least as pertains to unemployment policies, has, however, been questioned
by Inman and Rubinfeld (2001).) 
Second, the redistribution of income through such programs as Social Secu-
rity or the Food Stamp Program is usually more successful at the national
rather than subnational level (Warner, 2001) due primarily to variations in
macroeconomic conditions across States. For example, average poverty rates
from 1980 to 1999 ranged from a high of 18.7 percent in Mississippi to a
low of 5.3 percent in New Jersey, while average unemployment rates ranged
from 10.4 percent in West Virginia to 3.7 percent in Nebraska. In addition,
macroeconomic conditions are not distributed equally among States (e.g.,
some States are affected more by recessions than others). National control
of redistributive policies ensures that monies can be transferred from
wealthier States to poorer States, which helps to balance the effects of
cyclical variations. National control of redistributive policies also addresses
issues arising from the mobility of potential recipients of aid (i.e., the ability
to move to more generous localities1) and, conversely, the ability of
wealthier residents to leave an area if they are taxed at what they perceive as
too high a rate. Gundersen and Ziliak (2004) provide more information on
variations in macroeconomic conditions across States.
Third, population spillovers can place undue burdens on local jurisdictions,
requiring higher levels of government to help ensure the appropriate
delivery of public services by the jurisdiction affected by the spillover. For
example, central cities attracting suburban commuters may not be fully
compensated by the commuters for certain benefits and services provided,
such as transportation and communication services. In the absence of some
coordinating agency (e.g., a metropolitan authority), the city may be unable
to produce the optimal level of these services. 
Fourth, the costs associated with transferring control of a program from
Federal to State or more local government control may be especially large in
the short run, especially if the State or local government does not have an
existing administrative organization to support the devolved program.
Finally, pure national public goods, such as national defense, are best
funded, at least in part, at the national level. Rubinfeld (1987), Musgrave
(1959), and Oates (1972; 1999) provide more information on the advantages
of centralized programs.
Similarly, there are disadvantages to funding and managing some govern-
mental activities at the Federal level. First, preferences for government
3
A Consideration of the Devolution of Federal Agricultural Policy/ AER-836
Economic Research Service/USDA
1 While the mobility of residents is
often cited as a reason for control of
distribution activities at the national
level, there is not a consensus that res-
idents base decisions to relocate on
welfare benefits. (For example,
Enchautegui (1997) finds some migra-
tion from low- to high-benefit States,
while Walker (1994) finds no migra-
tion. Despite this lack of clear evi-
dence, some research shows that States
do set benefit levels in response to the
benefit levels of neighboring States
(e.g., Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid, 1999).programs differ across the country. A central agency administering a
program at the national level may lack the information base needed to
accommodate the range of differences. Also, political pressures may dictate
that central governments provide a more uniform level of services, even
when local communities would prefer lower or higher levels of services
(Oates, 1999, p. 1123). In contrast, local policymakers are better able to
tailor programs to match the preferences of residents and can be held more
accountable for their actions than Federal officials. Locally controlled and
tailored policies are also more likely to result in higher levels of welfare for
local citizens than more uniform policies implemented from afar. Using
direct measures to analyze the effects of devolution, Bradford and Oates
(1974) find evidence of large gains in welfare for local areas. 
Second, program costs vary among areas across the country. For example,
costs (defined broadly to include such things as the opportunity cost of lost
wages) of cleaning up a groundwater aquifer (Pinkowski, 1998) or a closed
military base (Wernstedt, 2000) may differ across jurisdictions. So, even if
preferences were identical, economic considerations may lead different
jurisdictions to choose different methods to clean up a site. Lastly, States
designing their own programs can learn from the success or failure of other
States’ programs. Case et al. (1993) provide more information on the “labo-
ratory effect,” which several States used to their advantage in designing
programs following welfare reform in 1996.
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Historically, agricultural policy in the United States has been concentrated at
the Federal level. Proponents of devolution argue that centralized programs
do not always address the diversity of the agricultural sector. Kuhn and
Offutt (1999) and other studies provide evidence of the extent of diversity in
the agricultural sector at both regional and State levels, which helps illus-
trate the advantages of devolution. Still, some aspects of agricultural policy
are best maintained at the national level.
Concentration of Agricultural Policy 
at the Federal Level
Federal and State Governments have long shared responsibilities for public
agricultural policies and programs. In the earliest days, Federal regulation of
trade had a significant impact on agriculture as commodities were the foun-
dation of the American economy. As the Nation developed, Federal policy
spurred the growth of agriculture through its emphasis on farm settlement,
capitalizing on the country’s abundance of land and scarcity of labor
(Halcrow, 1977, p. 2). Other Federal Government actions that affected the
agricultural sector included the establishment of a legal infrastructure
supporting land settlement, the creation of a transportation network, and a
general strengthening of democratic institutions. 
A landmark in the partnership between Federal and State Government was the
passage of the Morrill Act in 1862. The Act gave a grant of public land to
each State and U.S. territory for the purpose of “supporting the building of
colleges dedicated to the propagation of agriculture and mechanic arts”
(Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1975, p. 69). In 1890, a second Morrill Act
established Federal grants of $25,000 to each State’s land college. Federal
support of State-based research and education recognized the diversity of
conditions facing State agriculture and also the possibility of spillover benefits
of research and education from one State to another by provision of more and
better food, migration of skilled labor, or the transfer of knowledge.
The beginning of the 20th century was the “golden age” of American agri-
culture. As the scientific underpinnings for agriculture were built, Federal
and State Governments further emphasized research and education. At the
same time, after a long period of laissez faire, Federal and State Govern-
ments standardized rules and regulations in a wide array of industries and
services in the food resource sector, including commodity markets, rail and
freight services, and food inspection (Halcrow, 1977). When agricultural
export markets collapsed after World War I, the Federal Government inter-
vened to re-establish the favorable price relationships of the golden age.
Since the 1920s, Federal policy has played the leading role in managing the
economic condition of the American farm sector. The intersection of domestic
and international markets and the need for market regulation and funding on a
national scale called for Federal, rather that State, support. Though their roles
were minimized, each State continued to provide services to its farm sector,
and today all 50 States maintain departments of agriculture.
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at the Regional Level
Agricultural diversity in the U.S. farm sector extends to both State and
regional levels. USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) has defined nine
resource regions, each with distinct types of farming (fig. 1). For example,
in the Northern Crescent, the primary commodities are dairy, general field
crops, and cash grains, whereas in the neighboring Northern Great Plains,
the primary commodities are wheat, cattle, and sheep. In the Fruitful Rim,
the primary types of farms are fruit, vegetable, nursery, and cotton, while in
the neighboring Southern Seaboard, the primary farm types are general field
crops and poultry. The concentration of farms, as measured by the share of
all U.S. farms within regions, also varies. The Heartland has the largest
share of total farms (22 percent) while the Mississippi Portal (5 percent), the
Basin and Range (4 percent), and the Northern Great Plains (4 percent) have
the lowest share of farms.2 The value of production also differs among
regions, but in ways that are not simply a reflection of the number of farms.
For example, the Heartland has the largest number of farms and the highest
value (23 percent) of total farm production, but the Fruitful Rim, with 10
percent of farms, has almost the same contribution to total farm production
(22 percent). In contrast, the Eastern Uplands has 15 percent of total farms
but only 5 percent of total production. 
Average farm household incomes also vary among regions. In 1997, the
Fruitful Rim was by far the wealthiest region, with an average farm house-
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2 These and all succeeding statistics in
this paragraph are from the 1997
Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS) as summarized in
Gundersen et al. (2000).
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.hold income of $73,140, over $17,000 higher than the next wealthiest
region, the Heartland. The Northern Great Plains had the lowest average
farm household income, $39,700. These averages, however, belie the differ-
ences in the distribution of income across regions. For example, the Fruitful
Rim has a higher share of farm households with incomes under $25,000 a
year (28 percent) than the Heartland (25 percent). Conversely, 23.2 percent
of farms in the Basin and Range have household incomes over $100,000,
while 19.4 percent of farms in the Fruitful Rim have household incomes
over $100,000. Regional differences are also evident in the average number
of hours worked on the farm—the average annual hours worked range from
1,379 in the Mississippi Portal to 2,543 in the Northern Great Plains—and
in average education levels—33.7 percent of household heads in the Fruitful
Rim have college degrees, compared with 10.1 percent in the Northern
Great Plains. Lastly, the costs of production differ widely across regions
(Morehart et al., 2000).
Diversity of the Farm Sector at the State Level
In addition to the differences between regions, there are differences between
States within regions and between States with similar agricultural products.3
Differences in State agricultural preferences are exemplified in the mission
statements or recent goals posted on the Web sites of the departments of
agriculture in Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas.
The goals of the Iowa Department of Agriculture for 2001 include building
a department that can respond quickly and efficiently to changing global
conditions in agriculture; increasing Iowa’s agricultural market share both
domestic and foreign, and assisting in the removal of unnecessary barriers to
agricultural trade; developing and encouraging agricultural education and
new avenues for Iowa producers to market their products; increasing the
independent farmers’ impact on the market; adding value in Iowa to agricul-
ture by developing new products; creating a link for Iowa farmers with
consumer-ready markets; preserving Iowa’s precious soil; and improving
water quality to ensure opportunities for future generations of Iowans.
While the Iowa Department of Agriculture sees its primary mission as
improving the status of Iowa farmers, the Missouri Department of Agricul-
ture has a broader mandate. According to its strategic plan, the department
values a prosperous agricultural economy that will enable all Missourians to
achieve a higher quality of life; the preservation and enhancement of its
environment and agricultural resources; a market-based economy and a level
playing field for all those involved; consumer confidence in a quality
product at a fair price; and opportunities for personal growth, professional
development, and organizational advancement.
The Kansas Department of Agriculture, by contrast, emphasizes its regula-
tory role. According to its mission statement, the department has established
itself as the premier food safety, consumer protection, and natural resource
protection agency in Kansas. This strong foundation enables it to more
effectively advocate and educate on behalf of Kansas agriculture. The
department, the mission statement adds, is, first and foremost, a regulatory
agency. It is charged by law with ensuring the safety of the meat, milk, and
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3 There is also, of course, great diver-
sity in preferences at the sub-State
level (Orazem et al., 1989). We do not
consider devolution below the State
level, but, in principle, any State could
devolve to lower levels. In the case of
TANF, some States (e.g., California)
have devolved to the county level.egg supply; the responsible and judicious use of pesticides and nutrients; the
integrity of weighing and measuring devices in commerce; and the benefi-
cial use of State waters.
The range of support for value-added agriculture also illustrates agricultural
diversity among States. According to Kilkenny and Schluter (2001), States
have a long history of using various means to increase the value of agricul-
tural products, and all 50 States have at least one value-added agriculture
program. To encourage value-added agriculture, States provide capital,
entrepreneurial expertise, marketing, and other types of assistance. The level
of assistance and the eligibility requirements for assistance varies. For
example, some States require that aid recipients be located in rural areas,
while other States target assistance at small businesses rather than rural
areas. Given the diversity in agriculture across States, it is not surprising
that States encourage different types of value-added agriculture. For
example, 14 States encourage ethanol production and 8 States focus more
exclusively on agricultural products. Finally, States differ in their methods
of financing these programs. Sources of financing include bonds, revenues
from income and sales taxes, user taxes, license fees, and severance taxes. 
Advantages and Disadvantages Associated 
With the Devolution of Agricultural Policy
The differences in State approaches to agricultural policies imply differ-
ences in preferences across States. For example, some States emphasize
environmental issues and, therefore, may want to employ more set-asides of
agricultural land than current Federal programs, such as the Conservation
Reserve Program. Conversely, other States may decide, based on the prefer-
ences of residents, that the costs of environmental improvements exceed the
benefits. States in which many farmers are struggling financially and have
limited opportunities to recover may choose to invest in job training and
education to facilitate transitions from farming to other professions. Other
States may view such setbacks as temporary and design subsidies to help
farmers weather financial difficulties. Some States may view persons who
recently left the farm sector as being under the purview of agricultural
safety nets and thus provide them with assistance of some sort. Others may
extend eligibility for assistance to current farmers only.
The varying uses of funds from tobacco settlements provide further
evidence of different preferences among States with respect to farm policy.
At least one State (Maryland) has offered to buy out its tobacco farmers,
while other States, such as Virginia, have used the funds to provide
economic assistance to tobacco farmers and tobacco-dependent communi-
ties. The preservation of farmland around metropolitan areas is regarded by
some States as aesthetically important while other States view such farm-
land as a useful source of urban growth. States also differ in their perspec-
tives on using development to improve conditions in rural areas. Johnson
(2001) provides more information on federally designed rural development
initiatives and the lack of recognition of diversity in rural areas. If agricul-
tural policy is run at the Federal level, tailored responses to these and other
specific local issues are more difficult to implement than if policy is run at
the State level. 
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national level. For example, the Federal Government can best address food
safety issues arising from agricultural spillovers between States. Similarly,
Federal management may be preferred in cases of environmental spillovers
(e.g., when a river runs between two or more States). Given the current
construction of international trade agreements, agricultural trade issues are
also best handled at the national level because negotiations between indi-
vidual States and foreign governments would be difficult.
As suggested earlier, programs that play a fiscal stabilizing or distributive
role are best run at the national level. Neither of these categorizations
appears to hold in the context of farm programs. Food security concerns are
similar to fiscal stabilization insofar as, in difficult times, food insecurity
may increase in the United States. However, international agricultural trade
is pervasive enough that any shortfall in U.S. production can be easily reme-
died. In theory, agricultural policy does serve a redistributive role; however,
empirically, the farm safety net primarily benefits wealthy rather than poor
farmers. For example, 19.4 percent of limited-resource farmers receive
safety net payments, while 60.5 percent of very large family farms receive
safety net payments. The average amounts received by these farm types are
similarly skewed—a little over $2,000 for limited-resource farmers,
compared with over $32,000 for very large family farmers. Gundersen et al.
(2000) provides more information on the distribution of farm safety net
payments. The mobility of residents, which also factors into arguments for
national-level policies, is less likely to apply to the farm sector, due to the
relative lack of mobility of agricultural capital. Nelson et al. (1989) provides
more information on asset fixity in agriculture.
The existing structure of USDA funding and program delivery already
reflects, in a modest way, an appreciation of the gains from devolution.
Differences in State and regional preferences for program priorities, as well
as disparities in costs, are accommodated in some programs. Of course, as
can be seen in agricultural research programs, the degree of devolution
varies, with block grants to States existing alongside federally directed
programs. Moreover, Federal administration can provide a measure of flexi-
bility to States and localities without relinquishing control, as is the case
with conservation programs. Still, as a starting point for discussion, it is
worth attempting to draw a line between greater and lesser devolution in
USDA programs.
In fiscal 2003 USDA’s budget authority was about $75 billion. This
authority was distributed across seven “mission” areas that are aligned with
the Department’s strategic goals. These goals included expanding economic
and trade opportunities; promoting health by providing access to safe,
affordable, and nutritious food; enhancing the quality of natural resources
and the environment; and supporting the ability of rural residents, communi-
ties, and businesses to prosper.
About $2 billion of USDA’s fiscal 2003 budget authority could be consid-
ered spent on devolved programs. This spending would include the portion
of research funds (about $650 million) distributed in formula-driven grants
to States, competitive grants awarded by peer review processes, and special
grants specified in annual appropriations. Another $640 million, repre-
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transferred to States and local governments for the awarding of grants and
technical assistance through State and private forestry programs. In the rural
development mission area, about $5 billion worth of grants and direct and
guaranteed loans (representing about $660 million in outlays) went to
community and investor-owned rural utilities and to State and local govern-
ments for infrastructure development. This breakout of devolved programs
is meant to be illustrative, rather than definitive, as the degree of devolution
is a rather subjective matter. A closer look at two of these programs helps
explain the characteristics of devolution.
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) is a voluntary
conservation program that addresses natural resource concerns based on
State and national criteria. Community work groups help ensure the
program reflects local needs and priorities. EQIP provides financial incen-
tives and technical and educational assistance to help farmers and ranchers
(1) mitigate or resolve soil, water, and related natural resources problems
and (2) comply with environmental laws. The distribution of EQIP funds
also reflects local environmental and conservation needs and priorities.
Funding is allocated based on proposals submitted to the State conserva-
tionist and reviewed by the State Technical Committee, which comprises a
team of conservation representatives. The State conservationist, with the
State Technical Committee’s input, selects proposals for funding. The
selected proposals are called priority areas and are primarily natural
resources based (most are watershed based).
The USDA Community Food Security Initiative, established by the 1996
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR), is charged with
“helping nonprofit groups, faith-based organizations, State and local govern-
ment agencies, tribes, and individual citizens to fight hunger, improve nutri-
tion, strengthen local food systems, and empower low-income families to
move toward self-sufficiency.” As the name of the initiative implies, these
efforts are carried out at the local level. As part of this program, local agen-
cies can apply for grants to implement initiatives they believe will help alle-
viate food insecurity at the community level. Food security is defined as
having access at all times to enough food for an active, healthy lifestyle.
Projects are funded from $10,000 to $25,000 and for 1-3 years. In fiscal
1996, $1 million was available, and funds were authorized through the year
2002, at $2.5 million per year.
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In its assumptions regarding USDA programs that should be considered for
devolution, this study omits consideration of food assistance programs
managed by the Food and Nutrition Service and the operations of the Forest
Service. The aims of these programs are less directly related to goals associ-
ated with the food system and with farms and rural people and communities
than the aims of other USDA programs. Moreover, because of the size of
these two agencies, which together account for $45 billion of the $75 billion
in USDA fiscal 2003 budget authority, and their scope, the consideration of
devolution of these food assistance and forest system missions deserves
separate attention.4
Following the logic of the theoretical argument about appropriate devolu-
tion, this study also excludes from consideration programs aimed at the
provision of a public good or that involve substantial spillover of benefits or
costs across States. Broadly speaking, operations and assistance intended to
support food safety, animal and plant health protection, and interstate and
international market regulation would thus not be candidates, nor would the
portion of research spending on Federal intramural activities for information
gathering. These programs represented $3.5 billion of USDA outlays in
fiscal 2001. The majority of the potentially devolvable funding is found in
the domestic commodity and natural resource programs in rural develop-
ment and housing programs. In addition to the $2 billion already deemed to
be devolved, about $22 billion of fiscal 2003 budget authority could be
further considered (fig. 2). The broad assumptions here are intended to help
motivate further discussions about what represents appropriate devolution
and to provide some notion of the considerable potential for devolution
within existing USDA program and funding structures.
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4 The devolution of income assistance
under welfare reform and the retention
of the Food Stamp Program as a
Federal entitlement may be appropriate.
Under welfare reform, States have the
ability to experiment with the best way
to assist low-income households, but
they also have the assurance that the
Food Stamp Program can provide relief
to needy persons during a recession.
Assumptions regarding the extent of devolution, 2001
Figure 2
$ billion
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Other programs
Food safety
Marketing and regulatory programs
Research, education, and economics
Rural development
Natural resources and environment
Farm and foreign agricultural services
Food and nutrition and consumer services
0 10 20 30 40
National program
Potentially devolved
Currently devolvedIn general, if Federal programs are devolved to more local levels, program
funding will derive from three sources. First, States could assume all of the
fiscal responsibilities for these programs. This scenario represents a form of
complete devolution and, in the absence of unfunded mandates, would lead
to little Federal oversight of agricultural programs. Second, the Federal
Government could provide lump-sum transfers to States, and States would
bear any additional expenditures. TANF uses this funding mechanism.
Third, the Federal Government could provide matching funds to States,
where each dollar of State spending is matched to some specified level by
the Federal Government. Funding for AFDC, the predecessor to TANF,
followed this approach.
As noted earlier the Federal Government desires a role in some crucial areas
of agricultural policy, and political pressures would likely keep at least a
portion of the funding at the national level.5 Moreover, without Federal
assistance, States heavily dependent on the farm economy would be particu-
larly vulnerable to program shortfalls in the event of a downturn in the farm
sector. Federal assistance enables all States to share the risks inherent in
agricultural production. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) provide more informa-
tion on the variability of tax bases over the business cycle.
Based on the assumptions that block grants are the funding mechanism and
Federal funding remains at current levels, this study considers three possible
methods for allocating monies to States. The first method maintains the
current distribution of agricultural payments. Even in the absence of devolu-
tion, policymakers presumably consider some notion of the geographic
distribution of agricultural payments. Allocations based on current distribu-
tion levels would reflect these considerations. 
In the second method considered, monies are distributed in proportion to
Hatch Act funding. Under the Hatch Act of 1887, amended in 1995, Federal
funding for research at state agricultural experiment stations is allocated in
the following manner: 20 percent is allocated equally to all States, not less
than 52 percent is allocated based on the share of a State’s total population
in rural areas and the share of a State’s total population living on farms, not
less than 25 percent is allocated to multidisciplinary projects where a State
works with one or more States on issues of concern to more than one State,
and 3 percent is allocated to the administration of the Act. States must then
match any Federal monies with their own funds. In the second method, it is
assumed States’ allocation of monies implicitly reflects the importance of
agriculture in those States.6 Fuglie et al. (1996) provide more information
on the Hatch Act. 
Unlike the first two allocation methods, the third method does not use
existing Federal guidelines. Rather, it bases the distribution of monies on the
needs of farmers as defined by their income levels. Under this scenario, it
must be ascertained how much money, by State, would be required to raise
each farm household up to 185 percent of the poverty line in the absence of
current Government payments. The sum of money for all States represents
the national figure. This funding mechanism is similar to the funding mech-
anism used in other programs, such as TANF, where distribution levels
reflect State need. It shall be noted that this study examines distributional
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5 Except for funding levels, a discus-
sion of the Federal role for devolved
programs is beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, we presume the
Federal Government would continue to
have some authoritative role. In some
instances, this role would entail direct
oversight of specific practices. For
example, the Federal Government
would presumably continue to enforce
antidiscrimination laws. In other
instances, the Federal Government
would establish targets for States to
meet but would not dictate how these
targets would be met. As an example,
the Federal Government may set maxi-
mum allowable pollution levels but
may not dictate how these levels
would be achieved. 
6 Another proposal for the allocation
of Federal funds comes from the
National Association of State
Departments of Agriculture
(http://www.nasda.org/joint/farmbill/
allocation.pdf)issues only; the equity and efficiency associated with these distributions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
These funding mechanisms are suggestive of possible distribution methods
and were considered for their simplicity and precedents in existing
programs. Clearly, any actual method of devolution would differ. In making
such decisions, one would have to consider the incentives associated with
alternative methods. For example, if States were to receive money based on
the number of farmers (as at least partially done in the Hatch Act funding
scenario), States may have an incentive to overstate the number of farmers.
Of, if States were to receive money based on the crop mixture (as at least
partially done in the current funding scenario), States may provide incen-
tives to farmers to choose favored crops. While any choice of funding mech-
anism has the potential for opportunistic behavior at the State level, the
current system of agricultural programs has numerous negative incentives.
Gardner (1992) provides more information on negative incentives.
The funding scenarios here consider devolution to the State level. While
regional devolution is possible, it is unusual in the United States, though
common in other countries, such as Italy and Canada. Devolution to the
States would allow State governors to determine the appropriate farm policy
for their constituents and would encourage States to experiment with
program design. Arguments for devolution cite its encouragement of democ-
racy, that is, those responsible for programs can be held more accountable
when control is at the local level (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). For
example, in States with a substantial agricultural sector, the governor’s
performance in handling farm policy would be especially relevant to voters. 
Many States already have the necessary infrastructure in place to manage
agricultural programs. Table 1 simulates allocations of Federal funds to
States under the three funding mechanisms considered in this section. The
allocations are based on data from 1999, the most recent year for which the
relevant data are available. Using the funding mechanism based on the
current allocation of direct government payments, the five largest recipients
of Federal agricultural payments in 1999 (Texas, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, and
Nebraska) would receive almost 40 percent of all devolved agriculture
payments. The 10 largest-recipient States (adding Minnesota, North Dakota,
Indiana, Arkansas, and South Dakota) would receive 62 percent of all
payments. This devolution method roughly mirrors the distribution of
production of the commodities traditionally supported by the Federal Trea-
sury (i.e., wheat, feed grains, cotton, rice, and dairy).
When devolved Federal agricultural monies are distributed based on the
Hatch Act method, the top five recipient States are North Carolina, Iowa,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Texas. These five States would receive 17 percent
of all devolved agricultural monies. The top 10 recipient States (adding Illi-
nois, New York, California, Wisconsin, and Michigan) would receive 33
percent of all devolved agricultural monies.
When agricultural monies are devolved based on the funds needed to
provide a safety net for low-income farm households, Texas, Kentucky,
Missouri, California, and Iowa receive almost 30 percent of Federal monies.
These States, plus the five next-largest recipients (Tennessee, Wisconsin,
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Table 1—Allocation of Federal funds to States under three 
funding mechanisms
State Current Hatch Act Safety net
$ million
Alabama 203 525 566
Alaska 2 132 NA
Arizona 123 259 26
Arkansas 878 454 576
California 744 687 1,130
Colorado 420 346 324
Connecticut 10 245 2
Delaware 22 172 35
Florida 88 394 809
Georgia 412 638 543
Hawaii 1 170 NA
Idaho 239 281 196
Illinois 1,955 750 624
Indiana 926 664 601
Iowa 2,142 831 1,111
Kansas 1,580 454 673
Kentucky 262 669 1,148
Louisiana 470 423 321
Maine 13 244 42
Maryland 77 328 100
Massachusetts 12 287 145
Michigan 444 678 466
Minnesota  1,435 659 766
Mississippi  492 536 401
Missouri 786 629 1,141
Montana 557 281 282
Nebraska 1,510 442 649
Nevada  3 162 61
New Hampshire 5 192 102
New Jersey  11 378 50
New Mexico 105 216 340
New York  134 745 436
North Carolina 325 855 573
North Dakota  1,087 318 596
Ohio 717 785 543
Oklahoma  601 412 730
Oregon 121 381 187
Pennsylvania 108 818 424
Rhode Island  1 164 22
South Carolina 145 453 263
South Dakota 852 315 298
Tennessee 238 667 992
Texas 2,187 759 2,336
Utah 34 242 125
Vermont 14 193 98
Virginia 113 551 772
Washington 308 488 486
West Virginia  13 353 332
Wisconsin  553 678 964
Wyoming 46 206 119
NA = not applicable.
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 1999.Florida, Virginia, and Minnesota), receive 47 percent of Federal monies.
While, by definition, this scenario reflects the distribution of deprivation
across States, it also roughly coincides with the number of farm households
in each State. Four of the five largest recipients also have the highest
number of farmers, and Kentucky has the sixth highest number. Out of the
second 5 largest recipients, 3 are in the top 11 States with the highest
number of farms.
The distribution of devolved payments differs quite dramatically among the
three scenarios, both in terms of States that would receive monies and the
distribution of monies. Only two States are in the top 5 in all three scenarios
(Texas and Iowa), and four States are in the top 10 in two of the scenarios
(Illinois, Minnesota, California, and Wisconsin). Sixteen other States stand
to be in the top 10 depending on the allocation method.
As described in this section, the share of money received under each
scenario by the 5 and 10 largest recipient States differs among the scenarios,
with the 10 largest recipients receiving the highest proportion of monies
under the current distribution, followed by the safety net distribution and the
Hatch Act distribution. Examining these allocations by the differences
between the largest and smallest recipients reveals further insights on devo-
lution to the State level. Under the current distribution, the gap between the
largest and smallest recipients of money is significant (i.e., Texas would
receive $2.2 billion while 14 States would receive less than $50 million).
The safety net distribution is somewhat less skewed: Texas would still
receive the largest amount ($2.3 billion), but only seven States would
receive less than $50 million. Under the Hatch Act distribution, the distribu-
tion gap among the States narrows even more. The biggest recipient, North
Carolina, would receive $855 million, while the smallest recipient, Alaska,
would receive $132 million. This lower variation between States under the
Hatch Act is due, in part, to the 20 percent of Hatch Act funding allocated
equally to all States.
The distribution of per farm benefits for the States also varies significantly
by the choice of funding mechanisms (table 2). Under the current distribu-
tion funding mechanism, the average farmer would receive over $35,000 in
North Dakota, almost $28,000 in Nebraska, and between $24,000 and
$27,000 in Illinois, Kansas, and South Dakota. These States are also in the
top 10 of total monies received under the current distribution funding mech-
anism. On a per farm basis, farm households in Florida, Kentucky, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia do not fare as well—the average farmers in these States
receive less than $3,000. Per farm payments are more evenly distributed
under the Hatch Act than under the current distribution method. Hatch Act
payments range from $15,000 in North Carolina to $3,000 in Texas. Bene-
fits under the safety net scenario are also more evenly distributed than under
the current distribution mechanism. The average farm in North Dakota
would receive about $20,000, while farmers in Ohio, the State receiving the
lowest payment, receive average payments of $7,000.
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Table 2—Per farm allocation of Federal funds to select States under
three funding mechanisms 
Funding mechanism
State Current Hatch Act Safety net
Dollars
Arkansas 18,298 9,459 11,993
California 8,502 7,850 12,911
Florida 1,996 8,960 18,378
Illinois 25,058 9,612 7,993
Indiana 14,465 10,380 9,395
Iowa 22,552 8,746 11,698
Kansas 24,681 7,090 10,514
Kentucky 2,907 7,433 12,757
Michigan 8,547 13,029 8,968
Minnesota 18,162 8,337 9,700
Missouri 7,210 5,769 10,470
Nebraska 27,967 8,185 12,010
New York  3,522 19,593 11,473
North Carolina 5,706 14,994 10,053
North Dakota  35,875 10,504 19,655
Ohio 8,963 9,812 6,784
Pennsylvania  1,825 13,859 7,188
South Dakota 26,226 9,699 9,155
Tennessee 2,642 7,412 11,021
Texas 9,675 3,359 10,338
Virginia  2,297 11,243 15,751
Wisconsin  7,182 8,811 12,514
Note: States shown are among the top 10 recipients in at least one of the funding 
mechanisms.
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 1999.References
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